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A Model of Responsive Workplace Law
DAVID J. DOOREY *
The North American model of workplace law is broken, characterized by declining frequency 
of collective bargaining, high levels of non-compliance with employment regulation, and 
political deadlock. This paper explores whether the theory of “decentred regulation” offers 
useful insights into the challenge of improving compliance with employment standards laws. 
It argues that the dominant political perspective on workplace regulation today is managerialist. 
Politicians with a managerialist orientation reject both the pluralist idea that collective bar-
gaining is always preferred and the neoclassical view that it never is. Managerialists accept 
a role for employment regulation and unions, particularly in dealing with recalcitrant 
employers who mistreat their employees. The fact that managerialists and pluralists agree 
on this latter point creates a space for potential movement on workplace law reform. A law 
that encourages “high road” employment practices, while fast-tracking access to collective 
bargaining for “low road” employers could encourage greater compliance with employment 
regulation, while also facilitating collective bargaining at high-risk workplaces. This article 
examines lessons from scholarship on decentred regulation for the design of a legal model 
capable of achieving these results. In particular, it develops and assesses a dual regulatory 
stream model that restricts existing rights of employers to resist their employees’ efforts to 
unionize once they have been found in violation of targeted employment regulation.
On ne respecte plus le modèle nord-américain du droit du travail, en raison d’une fréquence 
à la baisse des négociations collectives, d’un degré élevé de non conformité aux règlements 
sur l’emploi et d’une impasse politique. Cet article se demande si la théorie de la 
« réglementation décentralisée » procure des points de vue utiles quant au défi  d’améliorer 
la conformité aux lois sur les normes du travail. Il fait valoir que, de nos jours, la perspective 
politique dominante sur la réglementation du travail est gestionnariste. Les politiciens ayant 
une orientation gestionnariste rejettent à la fois l’idée pluraliste voulant que les négociations 
collectives soient toujours préférables et le point de vue néoclassique voulant qu’elles ne 
* Ph.D., Associate Professor, York University. Earlier versions of this article were presented at 
the Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference, Cambridge University, 2011 and Le Centre 
de recherche interuniversitaire sur la mondialisation et le travail (CRIMT), Laval University, 
2010. My thanks to Harry Arthurs, Cynthia Estlund, Kerry Rittich, Roy Adams, Bernie 
Adell, Mike Zimmer, and Paul Secunda for comments, suggestions, and criticisms of earlier 
drafts of this article. I am grateful for research funding provided by the Social Sciences & 
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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le soient jamais. Les gestionnaristes admettent l’utilité des règlements sur l’emploi et des 
syndicats, plus particulièrement lorsqu’il s’agit de traiter avec des employeurs récalcitrants 
qui maltraitent leur employés. Le fait que les gestionnaristes et les pluralistes s’entendent 
sur ce qui précède pourrait favoriser une réforme du droit du travail. Un droit privilégiant des 
pratiques d’emploi « normalisées » tout en accélérant l’accès aux conventions collectives 
pour les employeurs « non conformes » pourrait entraîner une plus grande conformité aux 
règlements sur l’emploi, tout en facilitant la négociation collective dans les lieux de travail 
à risque élevé. Cet article se penche sur les leçons tirées de la recherche universitaire sur 
la réglementation décentralisée pour l’élaboration d’un modèle juridique pouvant atteindre 
ces résultats. En particulier, il élabore et évalue un modèle réglementaire à double courant 
qui restreint le droit actuel des employeurs de résister aux efforts de syndicalisation de leurs 
employés lorsqu’il a été constaté qu’ils ont violé la réglementation d’emploi visée.
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AS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY drew to a close, there was much soul searching 
within academic and labour policy circles about the future of workplace law.1 
Th is period of refl ection revealed an emerging consensus that the old ways of 
governing work were no longer eff ective—if ever they had been—and that new 
approaches were necessary. Evidence of the failure of workplace law included 
high levels of non-compliance with employment standards legislation,2 persistent 
inequality of opportunities and compensation for women and minority groups,3 
alarming and growing levels of income inequality,4 and the falling percentage 
of workers represented by unions.5 If there was widespread agreement that the 
existing approach to workplace law in Canada and the United States was defi cient, 
there was—and is—little consensus on how to fi x it. Th ere is no shortage of ideas. 
However, political fragmentation and indiff erence has meant that few proposals 
have advanced beyond the initial debate stage, and that those that have advanced 
1. Katherine VW Stone, “A Labor Law for the Digital Era: Th e Future of Labor and 
Employment Law in the United States” in Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, Seth D Harris & Orly 
Lobel, eds, Labor and Employment Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) 
689; Bob Hepple, “Th e Future of Labour Law” (1995) 24:4 Indus LJ 303; Chris Engels 
& Manfred Weiss, Labour Law and Industrial Relations at the Turn of the Century: Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Professor Roger Blanpain (Th e Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1998); John DR Craig & S Michael Lynk, eds, Globalization and the Future of Labour Law 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin 
& Gillian S Morris, eds, Th e Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple, Q.C. 
(Oxford: Hart, 2004); Stewart J Schwab, “Predicting the Future of Employment Law: 
Refl ecting or Refracting Market Forces?” (2001) 76:1 Ind LJ 29. 
2. See e.g. Harry W Arthurs, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century 
(Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2006) at 190-95 [Arthurs, 
Fairness at Work] (noting that 75% of federally regulated employers are in violation of 
federal employment standards laws); Roy J Adams, “Employment Standards in Ontario: An 
Industrial Relations Systems Analysis” (1987) 42:1 RI 46; and Mark P Th omas, Regulating 
Flexibility: Th e Political Economy of Employment Standards (Montreal: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2009).
3. See e.g. Sheila Block, Ontario’s Growing Gap: Th e Role of Race and Gender (Ottawa: Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010).
4. See Kerry Rittich, “Between Workers’ Rights and Flexibility: Labor Law in an Uncertain 
World” (2010) 54 Saint Louis ULJ 565 at 567; Michael Lynk, “Labour Law and the New 
Inequality” (2009) 15 Just Lab 125 at 129.
5. Lance Compa, Unfair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States under 
International Human Rights Standards (August 2000), online: Human Rights Watch <http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor/>; Cynthia L Estlund, “Th e Ossifi cation of Labor Law” 
(2002) 102:6 Colum L Rev 1527 [Estlund, “Ossifi cation”]; Richard B Freeman & Lawrence 
F Katz, “Rising Wage Inequality: Th e United States vs Other Advanced Countries” in 
Richard B Freeman, ed, Working Under Diff erent Rules (New York: Russell Sage, 1994) 29; 
Lynk, ibid.
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represent only modest tinkering, leading to little if any measurable change in 
working conditions. 
Th e “ossifi cation” of workplace law in North America has led some scholars 
to investigate the potential contribution of a strand of legal theory known as 
“decentred regulation,” which is popular in other spheres of governance.6 
Decentred approaches to regulation come armed with fresh names, such as “new 
governance,”7 “responsive regulation,”8 and “refl exive law.”9 A central observation 
shared by the various strands that fall under the umbrella of decentred regulation 
is the state’s frequent incapacity to “command” changes in business behaviour 
through the threat of sanctions. At the same time, decentred regulation points 
to the many forces other than the state that infl uence behavioural norms. It 
emphasizes the potential for the state to use regulation to harness private power 
so as to provoke and steer self-refl ection and self-regulation in ways that further 
state objectives.
Th is article explores whether there are useful lessons in decentred regulation 
scholarship for workplace law reform. My interest is in a particular form of 
decentred regulation, which I will label “instrumental decentred regulation.” It is 
instrumental because it is policy-driven, state-made law intended to achieve public 
policy objectives. It is useful to make this explicit, since decentred regulation is 
often (mis)understood as synonymous with corporate “self-regulation” and an 
agenda promoting a lesser state role in the governance of business. As such, it 
is easily dismissed or ignored by those who favour more, not less, government 
6. Estlund, ibid.
7. Orly Lobel, “Th e Renew Deal: Th e Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Th ought” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev 342 [Lobel, “Renew Deal”]; 
Orly Lobel, “Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev 
498 [Lobel, “Setting the Agenda”]; Cynthia Estlund, “Corporate Self-Regulation and the 
Future of Workplace Governance” (2009) 84:2 Chicago-Kent L Rev 617 at 622 [Estlund, 
“Self Regulation”]; Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-
Regulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) [Estlund, Regoverning].
8. Phillippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Harper Torch Books, 1978); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
9. Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Refl exive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17:2 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 239 [Teubner, “Modern Law”]; Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, Refl exive Labour 
Law: Studies in Industrial Relations and Employment Regulation (Boston: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation, 1994); David Doorey, “Who Made Th at?: Infl uencing Foreign Labour Practices 
Th rough Refl exive Domestic Disclosure Regulation” (2005) 43:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 353 
[Doorey, “Who Made Th at”]; Eric W Orts, “Refl exive Environmental Law” (1995) 89:4 Nw 
UL Rev 1227; Michael C Dorf, “Th e Domain of Refl exive Law,” Book Review of Regulating 
Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm by Jean L Cohen, (2003) 103:2 Colum L Rev 384.
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oversight of business activities. Here, instrumental decentred regulation describes 
an approach to governance that is guided by a bundle of insights into the 
relationship between legal signals and behavioural norms, not by any particularly 
normative political agenda. To use workplace law as an example, the insights it 
draws on can be deployed to relax or strengthen employment standards and to 
promote or discourage collective bargaining.
In Part I, the article begins by exploring common themes that defi ne the 
decentred approach to regulation. It then considers, in Part II, the implications 
of the decentred approach for the design of business regulation and for research 
agendas in regulatory studies. Part III describes four regulatory tools commonly 
associated with the decentred approach. Th e fi nal two parts of the article are 
devoted to a discussion of how the insights drawn from the decentred regulatory 
literature could be deployed to improve compliance with employment standards 
legislation in Canada. 
Part IV examines the contemporary political economy of workplace law 
reform and argues that the dominant political perspective in Canada today is best 
understood as managerialist. Th is perspective is ideologically situated somewhere 
between the industrial pluralist perspective, which favours a strong state and 
collective bargaining, and the neoclassicalist perspective, which advocates 
for limited government intervention in labour markets and against collective 
bargaining. Th ose who hold the managerialist perspective believe the decision 
by workers to unionize is a rational and acceptable response by workers to 
perceived mistreatment by employers, but that unionization is neither necessary 
nor benefi cial in cases where employers act responsibly in their dealings with 
employees. Th erefore, in contrast to the pluralist perspective, managerialists do 
not believe the state should encourage collective bargaining as a preferred policy 
model. However, contrary to the position of neoclassicalists, managerialists 
do accept a role for the state in ensuring that workers have access to collective 
bargaining when they feel mistreated.
Policies that fi t within the managerialist worldview have a greater chance 
nowadays to gain political traction than those that speak only to pluralists or to 
neoclassicalists. Th erefore, Part V of the paper considers a package of regulatory 
reforms to improve employment standards compliance that draw on insights 
from decentred regulatory theory and that are consistent with the mangerialist 
worldview of the appropriate role of employment and labour law. Th e objective 
is to design a regime that would steer employers onto a “high road” of progressive 
human resource management practices by better protecting workers whose 
employers opt for the “low road.” Our existing legal model is defi cient in both 
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regards. Th e alternative model discussed here incentivizes high road employment 
practices (including compliance with key employment law standards) while 
better enabling employees of low road employers to access collective bargaining. 
Th is model deploys the concept of a dual regulatory stream, drawn from the 
literature on decentred regulation, which assigns contrasting bundles of rights 
and obligations to employers depending upon the degree to which they comply 
with the state’s code of responsible employment practices. Th is article is cautiously 
optimistic about the potential contribution of insights from decentred regulatory 
theory to the challenges of reforming workplace law in North America, and 
concludes by recommending further debate about and exploration of the ideas 
presented in the article.
I. THE DECENTRED UNDERSTANDING OF REGULATION
Decentred regulation and new governance are umbrella terms intended to capture 
a subset of regulatory strands that share key premises or insights, which in turn 
guide their advocates towards a similar set of regulatory prescriptions.10 
Decentred regulation is often positioned as the alternative to more direct, 
top-down Command-and-Control (CAC) regulation. CAC regulation is 
frequently described in the literature on decentred regulatory theory as too rigid 
and blunt an instrument to eff ectively infl uence behaviour in complex modern 
societies. Th e reasons given for the failure of CAC regulation vary. In its most 
radical form, the argument forms a key component of autopoeitic systems theory, 
as developed by Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner, among others.11 North 
American critics of CAC rely less on systems theory, but argue that modern 
business has become too powerful and mobile, and that many social problems 
10. Th e works of Julia Black (decentred regulation) and Orly Lobel (new governance) are 
particularly useful in synthesizing this literature. See Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation: 
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” 
(2001) 54 Curr Legal Problems 103 [Black, “Decentring”]; Julia Black, “Critical Refl ections 
on Regulation” (2002) 27 Austl J Legal Phil 1; Julia Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation, 
Part I” (2000) 20:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 597 [Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation”]; Lobel, 
“Renew Deal,” supra note 7; Orly Lobel, “National Regulation in a Global Economy: New 
Governance Approaches to 21st Century Work Law” in Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, Seth D 
Harris & Orly Lobel, eds, Labor & Employment Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2009) 630 [Lobel, “New Governance”]; Lobel, “Setting the Agenda,” supra note 7.
11. Niklas Luhmann, Th e Diff erentiation of Society, translated by Stephen Holmes & Charles 
Larmore (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Gunther Teubner, Law as an 
Autopoietic System, translated by Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 
[Teubner, Autopoietic System]. 
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have become too complex to govern through a hierarchical legal system based on 
government commands backed by a threat of monetary sanctions.12
In the decentred account, legal systems evolve from an initial focus on 
formal laws that support the basic requirements of private ordering, including 
contract and property law, to a system of substantive legal regulation in which the 
state deploys law in active pursuit of social and economic policies.13 Inevitably, 
society’s problems become too complex for the substantive legal regime to 
manage, or subsystems within societies become over-legalized, creating a “crisis” 
of the regulatory state.14 At this point, a further evolution towards a third model 
of governance occurs in which the state recognizes its incapacity to engineer 
specifi c policy objectives through an array of CAC regulation and looks outwards 
towards other potential sources of governance that might be harnessed in pursuit 
of the state’s policy objectives.15
A. COMMON THEMES THAT DEFINE THE DECENTRED UNDERSTANDING OF 
REGULATION   
Th is bare-bones account of the evolutionary nature of law is suffi  cient to 
demonstrate the imperative in decentred literature for a realignment of the form 
of legal commands, as explained by Julia Black: 
CAC regulation posits a particular role for the state against which the “decentring” 
analysis is counterposed. It is “centred” in that it assumes the state to have the 
capacity to command and control, to be the only commander and controller, 
and to be potentially eff ective in commanding and controlling. It is assumed to 
be unilateral in its approach (governments telling, others doing), based on simple 
cause-eff ect relations, and envisaging a linear progression from policy formation 
through to implementation. Its failings are variously identifi ed as being, inter 
alia, that the instruments used (laws backed by sanctions) are inappropriate and 
unsophisticated (instrument failure), that government has insuffi  cient knowledge to 
be able to identify the causes of problems, to design solutions that are appropriate, 
and to identify non-compliance (information failure), that implementation of the 
12. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 76.
13. For an account of the evolutionary trajectory of legal systems in refl exive law, see Teubner, 
“Modern Law,” supra note 9. Orly Lobel sets out a similar narrative in her description of new 
governance theory in Lobel, supra note 10 at 381-86. See also William M Sage, “Regulating 
Th rough Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care” (1999) 99:7 Colum L 
Rev 1701; Orts, supra note 9; Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an 
Era of Self-Regulation” (2005) 105:2 Colum L Rev 319. 
14. Teubner, “Modern Law,” supra note 9. 
15. Gunther Teubner, “Regulatory Law: Chronicle of a Death Foretold” (1992) 1:4 Soc & Leg 
Stud 451 at 463; Orts, supra note 9 at 1260.
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regulation is inadequate (implementation failure), and/or that those being regulated 
are insuffi  ciently inclined to comply, and those doing the regulating are insuffi  ciently 
inclined to comply (motivation failure).16
Black identifi es a number of common insights or “aspects” that together comprise 
a decentred understanding of regulation.17 
First, the causes of modern social problems are said to be complex and 
shaped by interactions between a variety of forces that are poorly understood.18 
Second, no one actor, certainly not the state, possesses the knowledge or expertise 
to understand how normative behaviour is determined in light of this complexity 
(there is “fragmented knowledge”).19 Th ird, there is a plurality of sources of 
normative behaviour. Formal, state-based law is one source, but often other 
social or economic forces are equally signifi cant to, or more signifi cant than, 
government regulation as determinants of behaviour.20 Th us, decentrists are also 
legal pluralists.
Fourth, a decentred orientation to regulation recognizes that the targets 
of regulation are complex, autonomous actors with their own objectives, 
worldviews, and discourses. Since lawmakers cannot possibly know how every 
actor perceives his or her environment and, in any event, the targets of regulation 
are not homogeneous in this regard, regulation will cause behavioural changes and 
outcomes that are unintended.21 Decentred regulatory theory therefore requires 
the state to be engaged in a process of continuous learning through feedback 
loops: Th e state transmits legal signals, observes how actors and subsystems react, 
seeks input and counsel from knowledgeable actors, and then adjusts the signals 
accordingly in a process of ongoing, dynamic communication.22
16. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 106.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid at 106-07. See also Patrick Capps & Henrik Palmer Olsen, “Legal Autonomy and 
Refl exive Rationality in Complex Societies” (2002) 11:4 Soc & Leg Stud 547 at 551.
19. Orly Lobel notes that a premise of the new governance model is “that no one institution 
possesses the ability to regulate all aspects of contemporary public life.” See “Renew Deal,” 
supra note 7 at 380; See also Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation,” supra note 10 at 602.
20. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 108. See also Lobel, ibid at 373, explaining that a new 
governance approach is a regime “based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens 
from passive to active roles. Th e exercise of normative authority is pluralized.”
21. Gunther Teubner notes that because under a regime of refl exive law the “legal control of 
social action is indirect and abstract,” it may produce unpredictable outcomes. See “Modern 
Law,” supra note 9 at 255.
22. See e.g. Lobel, “Renew Deal,” supra note 7 at 377 (noting that new governance “advocates 
… the adoption of cooperative governance based on continuous interaction and sharing of 
responsibility”); Miriam Hechler Baer, “Governing Corporate Compliance” (2009) 50:4 
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A fi fth aspect of a decentred approach to regulation is the observation that 
regulation fosters and relies upon interdependencies between regulator and 
regulated. Rather than conceiving of the state as commander and the targets 
of regulation as commanded in a linear, hierarchical relationship, a decentred 
orientation embraces the notion that “interdependencies and interactions exist 
between government and social actors” and that each is dependent on the other 
for the resolution of complex social problems.23
Last, Black explains that a decentred approach to regulation involves the 
“collaps[ing] of the public/private distinction” and a “rethinking of the role of 
formal authority in governance and regulation.”24 It requires the state to move 
towards a regulatory strategy that encourages self-refl ection and continuous 
learning by the targets of regulation. In addition, it infl uences the contextual 
conditions of self-regulation and co-regulation with the aim of encouraging the 
private creation of substantive norms from the periphery of social and economic 
interactions by discovering ways to use law to infl uence communications and 
interactions between private actors.25 
B. DECENTRED REGULATION AS INSTRUMENTAL LAW  
Th e phrase “regulated self-regulation,” often associated with the decentred 
approach, usefully captures a key philosophical foundation of the decentred 
orientation.26 First, it emphasizes that regulation includes more than just orders 
BCL Rev 949 at 1004; Colin J Bennett & Michael Howlett, “Th e Lessons of Learning: 
Reconciling Th eories of Policy Learning and Policy Change” (1992) 25 Pol’y Sci 275 at 276 
(noting that “states can learn from their experiences and … can modify their present actions 
on the basis of their interpretation of how previous actions have fared in the past”); and 
Capps & Olsen, supra note 18 at 550.
23. Jan Kooiman argues that there is a shift from the conception of regulation as “‘one-way 
traffi  c’ from those governing to those governed” and towards “a ‘two-way traffi  c’ model 
in which aspects, qualities, problems and opportunities of both the governing system 
and the system to be governed are taken into account.” See “Social-Political Governance: 
Introduction” in Jan Kooiman, ed, Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions 
(London, UK: SAGE, 1993) 1 at 4.
24. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 110.
25. Ibid at 112; Teubner, supra note 11 at 67.
26. Th e idea that states should “regulate self-regulation” for instrumental purposes is now 
a common theme in decentred regulation scholarship. Cynthia Estlund notes that “law 
can eff ectively regulate complex organizations in modern society only by shaping those 
organizations’ own processes of self-regulation and inducing organizations to internalize 
public values. Hence the turn to what is sometimes called the regulation of self-regulation.” 
See “Who Mops the Floor at the Fortune 500: Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage 
Workplace” (2008) Lewis & Clark L Rev 671 at 682.
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issued by governments and backed by state-imposed penalties; it also includes 
private systems of rules that emerge outside of the state. Th is includes norms 
developed through attempts by fi rms to self-regulate, perhaps in response to 
incentives and risks introduced by government regulation, as well as norms that 
emerge through contestation, negotiation, confl ict, and dialogue between fi rms 
and others actors and networks of actors.27
Secondly, the phrase “regulated self-regulation,” or “enforced self-regulation,” 
reminds us that, in the decentred approach to regulation, the state continues to 
play a signifi cant role and continues to pursue public policy objectives.28 Th e state 
still decides what policies to pursue. Decentred regulation, like CAC regulation, 
is a form of instrumental law. Th ere is a big diff erence between self-regulation 
and decentred regulation, although this point is often misunderstood, as Bradley 
C. Karkkainen has noted:
One of the persistent and pervasive misconceptions about New Governance is that 
it is wholly reliant on “soft law” mechanisms, and therefore ultimately dependent 
on the good intentions and voluntary actions of parties who heretofore have shown 
little inclination toward acting in the desired directions. On those grounds, it is 
easily dismissed by its misinformed critics as so much wishful thinking.29
Self-regulation describes self-imposed and self-defi ned rules by private actors that 
may or may not be consistent with government policy objectives, and which 
may or may not be backed by some form of legal, moral, social, or market-based 
sanction.30 Decentred regulation, on the other hand, is government regulation 
in pursuit of public policy objectives, although the form of regulation that is 
expected to be eff ective varies from that in a CAC regime. Th is distinction is due 
to the very diff erent perceptions of the operational relationship between legal 
signals and regulated actors’ behaviour.31 
27. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at ch 5.
28. Lobel, “Setting the Agenda,” supra note 7 at 502 (“[new governance scholars] refuse to 
abandon the role of an active state in democracy”); See discussion of enforced self-regulation 
in Ayres & Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 8 at ch 4.
29. “‘New Governance’ in Legal Th ought and in the World: Some Splitting as an Antidote to 
Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev 471 at 488-89. 
30. See Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, “Really Responsive Regulation” (LSE Legal Stud Working 
Paper No 15, 2007), online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1033322> 
(provides a discussion of the distinction between state-based regulation that aims to infl uence 
behaviour indirectly and purely private regulatory systems in which the state plays no direct 
role).
31. Simon Deakin & Ralf Rogowski, “Refl exive Labour Law, Capabilities, and the Future of 
Social Europe” (University of Warwick School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 04, 
2011) at 7, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1780922>.
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY DESIGN AND RESEARCH 
A decentred approach to regulation would redefi ne and redeploy the range 
of appropriate regulatory tools that have traditionally been used in regimes 
characterized by CAC. Th is has implications not only for regulatory design, but 
also for research in regulation, including in workplace law. I will focus on three 
key insights associated with the decentered regulatory perspective: (1) an emphasis 
on how regulation can be used to infl uence the decision-making processes within 
regulated fi rms; (2) an awareness that non-state actors and networks of actors 
might be harnessed in pursuit of public policy goals; and (3) the potential benefi ts 
of risk-based regulation towards infl uencing fi rm behaviour. 
A. INTERNAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AS A TARGET FOR REGULATION 
Decentred regulatory theory perceives the process through which legal signals 
penetrate fi rms’ decision-making processes as highly complex. Mechanisms, 
pressures, incentives, personalities, cultures, social norms, histories, and discourses 
within fi rms muddy legal signals or translate them to fi t better with the fi rm’s 
culture or the worldview of its key personnel. To use the language of refl exive 
legal theory, a message transmitted from the legal subsystem to the economic 
subsystem will be reinterpreted according to the particular binary code used 
within the economic subsystem.32 Th e legal signal “pay the minimum wage,” for 
example, may be reinterpreted by economic actors according to the language of 
the economic subsystem—pay or do not pay, profi t or do not profi t.33 Perceived 
from the perspective of CAC regulation, the failure of the command—pay 
the minimum wage—refl ects a failure of enforcement. Th is leads to proposed 
solutions such as raising fi nes for non-compliance or ensuring more eff ective 
enforcement by government inspectors. Th e belief is that raising the anticipated 
fi nancial costs of non-compliance will improve the likelihood that otherwise 
non-compliant employers will then choose to comply. 
A decentred approach to the problem might also support higher fi nes and 
better enforcement, particularly for persistent off enders,34 but holds out little 
32. Teubner, “Modern Law,” supra note 9. 
33. See, for example, the discussion in Hugh Collins, Book Review of Refl exive Labour 
Law: Studies in Industrial Relations and Employment Regulation by Ralf Rogowski & Ton 
Wilthagen, eds, (1998) 61:6 Mod L Rev 916 [Collins, Book Review].
34. For example, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite proposed the idea of the ‘benign big gun,’ 
by which they meant that a responsive regulatory model required serious sanctions be in 
place to punish persistent off enders and to act as the ultimate incentive for fi rms to opt for 
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hope that this alone will transform overall compliance levels. As Gunther Teubner 
asserts, a direct legal command like “pay the minimum wage” has “little chance 
of being obeyed when it comes into direct confl ict with the profi t motive.”35 
Th e higher the fi nes for non-compliance, the greater the incentive for fi rms to 
hide their non-compliance from the state or to exit the regulating jurisdiction, 
if feasible. Conscious of these limits of CAC regulation, decentrists emphasize 
strategies intended to realign the fi rms’ economic interests with the state’s interest 
in improving compliance with the legal standards. In Philip Selznick’s words, the 
objective is to use regulation to get companies “to want to do what they should do.”36
Note that in this scenario, the state does not cease to set hard standards; it 
still determines whether a minimum wage is appropriate and what it should be. 
Instrumental decentred regulation does not mean replacing fi xed government 
standards with voluntary self-regulation. However, decentrists would propose 
a diff erent way of thinking about how the legal signals should be deployed in 
order to eff ect compliance. A fundamental objective of a decentred regulatory 
strategy is to infi ltrate the fi rms’ decision-making matrices and erect signposts 
that direct decision-makers towards the state’s desired course of action. Th at is 
why a common theme found in the decentred scholarship is the potential for 
regulation to re-orientate fi rms’ internal management systems and decision-
making processes by infl uencing the context and processes through which 
complex decisions are made.37 
Black observes, for example, that “one of the roles of refl exive law is to set the 
decision-making procedures within organizations in such a way that the goals of 
the more cooperative regulatory options. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 47-49. 
See also Collins, Book Review, ibid at 65; Estlund, “Self-Regulation,” supra note 7 at 624 
(“eff ective self-regulation depends on maintaining a serious background threat of public 
enforcement”); Lobel, “New Governance,” supra note 10 at 638-39; David A Dana, “Th e 
New ‘Contractarian’ Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” (2000) 1 U Ill L Rev 35 at 
47 (noting that new governance-style regulatory models still depend upon the existence of 
a strong government penalty to act as a threat to those businesses that do not participate 
meaningfully in the new approach).
35. Teubner, Autopoietic System, supra note 11 at 91.
36. Th e Communitarian Persuasion (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002) at 102; 
See also Christine Parker, “Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountatbility for Corporate Social 
Responsibility” in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds, Th e New 
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambidge University Press, 2007) 207 at 208; Christine Parker, Th e Open Corporation: 
Eff ective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
37. See e.g. Deakin & Rogowski, supra note 31 at 6.
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public policy are achieved.”38 Scott notes similarly that “the modest conception 
of law’s capabilities [in decentred regulatory theory] has led to a concern with 
targeting the internal management systems of regulated entities in order to 
secure compliance with regulatory goals.”39 Eric W. Orts identifi ed as a refl exive 
law strategy the aim of “channeling communications within the organizational 
structure of social institutions” with the expectation that infl uencing how 
information is gathered and used in an organization can infl uence how 
organizations respond to that information.40 
One example of a regulatory model that seeks to improve compliance 
with government standards by targeting the design and implementation of 
internal management systems is the American Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
for Organizations.41 Th e Guidelines allow for lesser sentences for organizations 
that have committed legal violations but had implemented internal compliance 
systems that meet the government’s established standards. Th e government 
standards for an “eff ective compliance program” include: (1) adoption of codes 
of conduct that include as a minimum compliance with all applicable laws; 
(2) communication and training of employees on the content of the code; (3) 
designation of a senior company offi  cial as responsible for compliance with 
the code; (4) adoption of systems designed to monitor the eff ectiveness of the 
code’s implementation; (5) adoption of incentives and disciplinary procedures 
designed to encourage compliance and respond to violations discovered; and (6) 
adoption of systems that enable confi dential reporting without fear of reprisals.42 
Th e objective was to steer fi rms towards implementing systems the state believed 
would improve compliance by off ering the ‘carrot’ of reduced penalties.
Th e concern with internal decision-making processes aff ects both the form 
of proposed regulation and the research agenda for lawmakers and regulatory 
38. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 127.
39. Colin Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: Th e Rise of the Post-Regulatory State” in 
Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds, Th e Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory 
Reforms for the Age of Governance (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004) 145 at 152.
40. Orts, supra note 9 at 1267; See also Daniel J Fiorino, “Rethinking Environmental 
Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance” (1999) 23:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 441 at 448 
(noting how refl exive law seeks to “strengthen ‘refl exion mechanisms’ within the [targeted] 
entity to encourage the desired behaviour”).
41. See discussion in Christine Parker, Th e Open Corporation: Eff ective Self-Regulation and 
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 2002) at 259-61; Estlund, Regoverning, 
supra note 7 at 77-78.
42. Ibid.
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scholars. Regulation that looks inside the managerial “black box,” to borrow 
Cynthia Estlund’s phrase, takes on greater prominence.43 Researchers are guided 
towards questions that explore internal fi rm dynamics and cultures and how 
they interact with external environment forces, such as markets, culture, and 
business risks. Th e process requires a close examination of how decisions are 
made within organizations and of questions such as: Whose job is it to learn 
what the employment standards are and to decide whether those rules will be 
complied with throughout an organization? How is information about legal rules 
received and transmitted within organizations? What motivates fi rms’ decision 
makers, and how might those motivations be altered to produce a diff erent set 
of incentives? A shift towards decentred regulation therefore focusses more on 
the dynamics of internal managerial processes and their impact on performance 
outcomes than is common in a CAC approach.
B. HARNESSING NON-STATE ACTORS AND NETWORKS THROUGH 
REGULATION
Legal pluralism has experienced a rebirth in parallel with the recent interest 
in decentred approaches to regulation.44 Th e lens of legal pluralism opens our 
eyes to the complex environment in which many fi rms operate and to the 
many sources of push and pull that act upon fi rms at any given moment. Th ese 
sources of infl uence are central to understanding why fi rms behave as they do. 
As Roderick A. Macdonald has noted, the rediscovery of legal pluralism means 
that “to understand the role that State law actually plays in a given social fi eld, 
it is necessary to understand the character and operation of multiple regimes of 
unoffi  cial law in the same fi eld.”45
Th is in turn requires the state to learn about those private actors that 
have an interest in fi rm behaviour in particular spheres, such as workplace 
practices. Unions are one such type of actor, but legal clinics, worker centres, 
faith-based organizations, activist shareholders, non-government organizations, 
and consumers might also be interested in labour practices. Andrew Dunsmire 
explains the regulatory technique of putting private sources of pressure to work in 
pursuit of government objectives as “collibration,” the goal of which is as follows:
43. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 133. 
44. Orly Lobel notes that the new governance approach is “based on engaging multiple actors 
and shifting citizens from passive to active roles. Th e exercise of normative authority is 
pluralized.” See “Renew Deal,” supra note 7 at 373.
45. Roderick A Macdonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal 
Pluralism” (1998) 15:1 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 69 at 77. 
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[T]o identify, in any area of interest, what antagonistic forces already operate, what 
… confi guration presently obtains, and what intervention would help create a more 
desirable position … not by … laying down a standard or a prohibition … but by 
giving that degree of ad hoc support to the side which needs it as will do the trick.46
All of the fi rms’ stakeholders—friend and foe—become potential sources of 
infl uence that might be put to use to help the state achieve its public policy goals. 
Again, this emphasis on the potential role of non-state actors in shaping 
business behaviour infl uences not only the form of potentially viable regulation 
but also the sort of research questions lawmakers and scholars should explore. Th e 
various actors, or stakeholders, must be mapped to identify their place and role 
within the web of infl uence in the particular sphere of conduct being targeted by 
the state. Th e nature of the relationship between the many private actors and the 
fi rms needs to be investigated, as do the relationships among the various actors. 
By investigating and mapping these relationships, the decentrist can then begin 
to identify what legal signals deployed into the milieu might promote the sorts of 
changes in behaviour the state desires.
C. INJECTING RISK AS A REGULATORY TOOL 
Th e third insight fl ows from the fi rst two. By recognizing that fi rms can be 
induced or provoked by external pressures and forces to make useful changes 
to their internal management systems, a decentred orientation alerts us to the 
possibility of using risk as a regulatory tool. When managers identify risks to 
the fi rms’ economic objectives (e.g., brand reputation, market share, share price, 
or profi tability), or to their own personal interests and ambitions (e.g., poor 
performance evaluations, loss of bonuses, discipline, or dismissal), we anticipate 
that they will take steps to eliminate or reduce those risks. In theory, these 
risk management responses may include steps that improve the likelihood of 
compliance with the state’s own policy objectives. Th is creates the possibility of 
using regulation to agitate internal management systems or to induce them to 
change by “injecting risk.”47 
Michael Power notes that risk management processes seek to normalize or 
embed greater responsiveness to potential sources of risk into the habits and 
routines of fi rms.48 By deploying legal signals that economic actors will perceive as 
46. “Modes of Governance” in Jan Kooiman, ed, Modern Governance: New Government-Society 
Interactions (London, UK: SAGE, 1993) at 34; See also Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 127.
47. Doorey, “Who Made Th at,” supra note 9.
48. “Risk Management and the Responsible Organization” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron 
Doyle, eds, Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 145 at 153.
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the introduction of a new risk, the state can activate risk management responses 
that might cause greater attentiveness to government regulatory standards to be 
embedded as a norm. Th e most common example of this, discussed in more detail 
below, is through information disclosure regulation. Requiring fi rms to collect 
and disclose information that, once made public, could harm fi rm reputation or 
be used by antagonistic actors to embarrass the fi rm may cause fi rms to design new 
systems to reduce the risk associated with the information disclosure.49 Th is might 
include better internal monitoring of potentially harmful practices and greater 
responsiveness to those practices once uncovered. In this way, information 
disclosure regulation can help achieve public policy objectives indirectly.50
Using risk to infl uence internal management systems would also require a 
diff erent sort of research agenda for lawmakers and workplace law scholars than 
what they have been used to. First, they would need to identify the sources of 
risk, or more specifi cally, what the targeted fi rms perceive as the sources of risk 
related to labour practices. Second, they would have to explore how risk signals, 
or how the presence of external risks, penetrate the fi rms’ decision-making 
apparatus. How do managers become aware of risks and monitor them? Th ird, 
they would be interested in learning how knowledge of the risk signals translates 
into action within a fi rm: What sorts of steps do fi rms take to manage or reduce 
the risks once they have been identifi ed? And last, they would want to consider 
whether regulation could be used to alter those risks, for example by elevating 
them, perhaps by increasing the potential damage to fi rms that fail to introduce 
precautionary measures desired by the state. 
III. COMMON TOOLS OF DECENTRED REGULATION  
What are the lessons from all of this for regulatory design? Black summarizes the 
decentred regulatory strategy as follows:
Th e hallmarks of the regulatory strategies advocated are that they are hybrid 
(combining governmental and non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (using a 
number of diff erent strategies simultaneously or sequentially), and indirect … . 
Essentially, decentred regulation involves a shift … in the locus of the activity of 
“regulating” from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the adoption on the 
49. Ibid at 145, 153. Power observes that “risk management” creates “an inner regulatory space” 
within fi rms that has the potential to “enfranchise” external stakeholders by giving voice 
within the organization to their concerns and interests. See also discussion in Doorey, “Who 
Made Th at,” supra note 9. 
50. See discussion in Doorey, “Who Made Th at,” ibid at 372-76. 
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part of the state of particular strategies of regulation. ...[G]overnments should not 
row and cannot steer, at least not directly. Rather they have to create the conditions 
in which fi rms, markets, etc. steer themselves, but in the direction that governments 
want them to go … .”51
Th e range of regulatory tools proposed to perform this steering role is varied, but 
there are a number of techniques that have come to defi ne the approach most clearly.
A. MULTIPLE REGULATORY STREAMS
One technique is the use of multiple regulatory streams. Th is strategy draws on 
the insight that a “one model fi ts all” approach to regulation may underutilize 
the state’s potential to infl uence behaviour through a mixture of risk and reward, 
incentives and sanctions. In theory, if properly designed, the state can align 
its policy objectives with fi rms’ business objectives by conditioning a more 
favourable regulatory stream on compliance with the state’s desired norms. Th e 
state’s preferred mode of behaviour is thus incentivized.52
Orly Lobel has praised this approach in relation to American experiments 
in occupational health and safety regulation.53 Lobel cites the Maine 200 pilot 
program developed in the 1990s, which sought to reduce high levels of workplace 
accidents in that state. Th e Maine area offi  ce of the federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) had devoted substantial resources to 
enforcement of the reams of rules and standards in the legislation and regulations, 
and yet workplace accidents remained high. Lobel notes that prior to the adoption 
of the Maine 200 program, Maine’s OSHA offi  ce “was imposing the most fi nes 
and still had the worst injury and illness rates in the country.”54 
In 1993, the 200 fi rms with the highest rates of lost days due to injuries 
were given a choice: experience increased government inspections for compliance 
under existing regulations, or participate in an alternative cooperative stream in 
which the state would principally educate and guide self-regulation. Almost all of 
the organizations opted for the new program. Th ey were required to develop and 
adopt a workplace safety program, aided by the OSHA. Th e program required 
51. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 111-13.
52. Th is is an operational assumption in Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8. Th ey propose a 
model that incentivizes eff ective self-regulatory schemes while threatening progressively 
heavier sanctions for businesses that do not eff ectively self-regulate.
53. See “Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: Th e Governance of Workplace Safety” 
(2005) 57:4 Admin L Rev 1071; See also Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 78-82.
54. Lobel, ibid at 1117.
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organizations to report problems and then work with the OSHA to address 
them. According to Lobel: 
Maine 200 was proclaimed as a great success, winning Ford Foundation and 
government awards for innovation. Employers self-identifi ed more than 14 times 
as many hazards as could have been cited by OSHA and signifi cantly lowered their 
injuries rates. 55
In the fi rst year of the program, worker compensation claims in Maine dropped 
by 35%. Th e perceived success of the Maine project inspired the Clinton 
Administration, which in 1995 announced a shift in occupational safety and health 
enforcement “from one of command and control to one that provides employers 
a real choice between a partnership and a traditional enforcement relationship.”56 
Cynthia Estlund has argued that preferential regulatory rules and processes, 
such as fewer inspections, should be off ered to employers who adopt a process of 
self-regulation of employment practices that includes some form of independent 
representation by their employees.57 Anticipating the objection that employers’ 
dislike of unions or other forms of independent representation would dissuade 
most employers from opting for the high road of self-regulation, she observes:
A crucial part of the calculus will be the nature of the default regime for non self-
regulators. Tougher regulatory scrutiny and sanctions on low-road employers will 
both make the high road more appealing and protect responsible self-regulators 
from unfair competition.58
Th e state still defi nes what is required to qualify for the more cooperative stream, 
and an organization can be thrust back into the more interventionist stream upon 
failing to satisfy these requirements. However, organizations that opt for the 
more cooperative stream are given guidance, support, and education by the state 
and granted the opportunity to prove that they can self-regulate their conduct in 
accordance with the state’s rules and objectives.59
Proponents of multiple regulatory streams identify several potential benefi ts. 
One is that compliance is likely to be higher when it makes good business sense 
55. Ibid at 1118.
56. Th e New OSHA: Reinventing Safety and Health (May 1996), online: United States 
Department of Labor <http://www.osha.gov/doc/outreachtraining/htmlfi les/newosha.html>; 
see discussion in Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 80. 
57. Regoverning, supra note 7 at 148-49. 
58. “A Return to Governance in the Law of the Workplace” (NYU Law School, Public Law & 
Legal Th eory Series No 10-39, 2010) at 11, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1640566>.
59. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 220.
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to comply, and off ering incentives for compliance as well as sanctions for non-
compliance will increase the probability of more fi rms electing to comply. By 
rewarding compliance with a less interventionist state, the model is applauded for 
positively reinforcing the tendencies of many managers to behave responsibly. In 
addition, the dual regulatory stream approach can encourage a more effi  cient use 
of limited state resources by allowing the state to direct more attention at high-
risk actors that show little interest in self-governing. 
B. VARIABLE SANCTIONING MODELS 
A related strategy involves reduced penalties for statutory infringements when 
fi rms have taken the precautionary procedural steps the state desires. Th e idea 
is to give fi rms credit, in the form of lesser penalties, if they have introduced 
internal management checks and balances designed to reduce the possibility of 
a violation, and yet the violation nevertheless occurs.60 Although the violation is 
the same in each case, the justifi cation for punishing the former fi rm to a lesser 
degree is that it is less blameworthy, since it made reasonable eff orts to avoid the 
problem in a manner endorsed by the state.61 Th e expectation is that more fi rms 
will take the precautions in order to obtain the benefi t of reduced penalties, and 
fewer violations will occur if more fi rms take these precautions.
C. EMPOWERING AND ENABLING PRIVATE ACTORS 
Private actors play an important role in the decentred approach to regulation. 
Th e state is encouraged to harness the norm-creating potential of non-state 
actors to achieve public policy goals. Th ere are numerous ways to do this. Some 
examples include: certifying or importing into regulation privately developed 
codes of conduct; providing government funding to private agencies and actors 
who help promote the state’s values or enforce regulations; or granting special 
legal privileges to organizations that perform services of value to the state.
60. Ibid at 133-35. Estlund notes that a decentred approach to regulation would consider not 
only the outcomes of fi rm behaviour, but would also consider as relevant to the assessment of 
damages steps taken within the fi rm to reduce the likelihood of wrongs occurring. 
61. Orly Lobel explains how the United States Supreme Court has recognized defences to 
workplace discrimination cases where the employer had adopted anti-discrimination or 
harassment policies. Th e cases were: Kolstad v American Dental Association 527 US 526 
(1999) and Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth 524 US 742 (1998). See Lobel, “Renew 
Deal,” supra note 7 at 421. For a criticism of this approach, see Susan Bisom-Rapp, “An 
Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing 
Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law” (2001) 
22:1 Berkeley J Emp & Lab L 1.
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Th e idea of empowering private actors to help achieve public goals is familiar 
to labour lawyers, who have long appreciated the importance of private norm 
creation in the workplace setting. For example, Michel Coutu observed recently:
[L]abour law continues to have some features of what Gunther Teubner has called 
refl exive law—that is, a form of interaction between state and private ordering, in 
which private parties are expected to refl ect on their own conduct and to regulate it 
in a way that is consistent with the social objectives of the particular area of law.62
Th e Wagner Act model exhibits many elements of a decentred approach to 
regulation. Namely, it aims to infl uence conditions of employment by adjusting 
the power relations in which employment contract terms are bargained by the 
actors themselves.63
Private actors can be extremely knowledgeable about the forces that infl uence 
behaviour. To use another labour and employment law example, there are a 
number of private stakeholders or actors that can have intimate knowledge of the 
reasons for low compliance with employment-related laws. Th ese include workers 
and employers, but also unions, employee advocacy organizations, legal clinics, 
ethnic-based advocacy groups, faith-based organizations with interests in employment 
practices within their communities, and even academics.64 A decentred approach 
to regulation encourages governments to tap into the wealth of knowledge and 
experience within these groups in their eff orts to improve labour practices. 65
62. “Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and State Sovereignty” (2007) 13 CLELJ 147 at 151. Gunther 
Teubner cited collective bargaining law as an example of refl exive law in his early work 
developing the theory of refl exive law. See Teubner, “Modern Law,” supra note 9 at 276; See 
also Jill Murray, “Th e Sound of One Hand Clapping? Th e ‘Ratcheting Labour Standards’ 
Proposal and International Labour Law” (2001) 14:3 Austl J Lab L 306 at 307; and Estlund, 
“Ossifi cation,” supra note 5 at 1527-29.
63. William B Gould, “Th e Th ird Way: Labor Policy Beyond the New Deal” (2000) 48:4 U Kan 
L Rev 751 at 752.
64. For example, there is a large literature exploring “community unionism” and the eff orts 
of poverty and outreach clinics in investigating and trying to improve compliance with 
employment regulation. See e.g. Cynthia J Cranford et al, “Community Unionism and 
Labour Movement Renewal: Organizing for Fair Employment” in Pradeep Kumar & 
Christopher Schenk, eds, Paths to Union Renewal: Canadian Experiences (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2006) 237; and Andy Banks, “Th e Power and Promise of Community 
Unionism” (1991) 18 Lab Research Rev 17 at 18-20.
65. See e.g. Arthurs, Fairness at Work, supra note 2 at 199. Professor Arthurs recommended 
that the federal government consider “providing funding to clinics that advise or represent 
workers in connection with their employment rights.” Th e rationale given was this: “Clearly, 
if advocacy and advice-giving organizations were better funded, workers would be better 
informed [about their legislative entitlements] and their rights under the statute would be 
better protected.”
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D. INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION 
Information disclosure regulation is another preferred tool in the decentred 
regulation arsenal for reasons mentioned earlier.66 Disclosure regulation is usually 
justifi ed as market-correcting: it corrects information asymmetries that impede 
the effi  cient clearing of markets.67 However, there is also a long history of using 
information regulation to infl uence fi rm behaviour in such areas as environmental 
and human rights practices.68 Disclosure can lead to better-informed actors. 
It facilitates self-learning or self-referential fact-fi nding; a fi rm that does not 
know it is engaging in harmful behaviour is unlikely to take steps to alter that 
behaviour. It can clarify the expectations of contracting parties, which can reduce 
the possibility of the more powerful contracting party taking advantage of the 
weaker party.69 
Disclosure regulation can also empower private actors in their engagements 
with the disclosing fi rms. By providing information about fi rm behaviour to 
private watchdogs, it can alter the relative balance of power between the fi rms and 
the watchdogs and thereby alter the dynamic of the negotiations. If disclosing 
information about some aspect of fi rm performance could potentially infl uence 
sales or increase public appetite for more formal government oversight, then it 
can encourage corporate leaders to take a more personal interest in the fi rm’s 
performance, and perhaps to introduce more eff ective systems to ensure that the 
fi rm’s performance improves relative to other similarly situated fi rms. 
IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY 
WORKPLACE REGULATION 
Any proposal for workplace reform will meet resistance. Th ere will always be 
those on the political right who reject any form of employment regulation, and 
66. See discussion in Doorey, “Who Made Th at,” supra note 9 at 374; Lobel, “New Governance,” 
supra note 16 at 641-42; Paula J Dalley, “Th e Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory 
System” (2007) 34 Fla St UL Rev 1089; and Cynthia Estlund, “Just the Facts: Th e Case for 
Workplace Transparency” (2011) 63 Stanford L Rev 351; Archon Fung, Dara O’Rourke & 
Charles Sabel, Can We Put an End to Sweatshops? (Boston: Beacon Press 2001).
67. See Dalley, ibid at 1094; See also Mary Graham, Democracy By Disclosure: Th e Rise of 
Technopopularism (Washington: Th e Brookings Institution, 2002); Robert E Verrecchia, 
“Essays on Disclosure” (2001) 32:1-3 J Acct & Econ 97.
68. Ibid; Bradley C Karkkainen, “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 257.
69. See e.g. Arthurs, Fairness at Work, supra note 2 at 81. 
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people on the political left who oppose reforms that fall short of overhauling 
capitalist relations, or that do not prioritize collective bargaining above all else. 
Reforms that have survived the legislative process over the past forty years have 
been forged in modest dimensions from the middle ground between these 
positions. One test for decentred regulatory theory is whether it off ers any insight 
into the challenge of steering workplace law out of its slumber in ways that 
could ultimately improve working conditions. Th is does not require consensus 
across the political and ideological spectrum—an impossible feat—but suffi  cient 
movement in the centre-left and centre-right within that spectrum to develop a 
critical mass of political and public support for innovative and useful reforms. 
As a preliminary exercise, it is useful to consider the political landscape 
as it pertains to workplace law in Canada today. Th e “hegemony of industrial 
pluralism” that dominated since the early 1950s has been eroding since the 
1980s.70 By the turn of the century, industrial pluralism, and its preference for 
collective bargaining, had fallen so far from favour that one of its leading voices, 
Harry Arthurs, had pronounced its death.71 Pluralism came under attack from 
the neoclassical perspective;72 neoclassicalists reject state-sponsored support 
for collective bargaining on the grounds that it distorts the free operation of 
labour markets, producing harmful economic outcomes.73 Th ey argue for limited 
state involvement in the regulation of the employment relationship in order to 
permit “free” markets to establish equilibrium conditions of employment.74 Th e 
ascendancy of the law and economics model associated with the neoclassical 
70. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: Th e Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action 
in Canada, 1900-1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 2001) at 302-03; Paul 
Weiler, “Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA” 
(1983) 96:8 Harvard L Rev 1769 at 1769; Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, From Consent to 
Coercion: Th e Assault on Trade Union Freedoms, 3d ed (Toronto: Garamond Press, 2003) ch 9. 
71. “Landscape and Memory: Labour Law, Legal Pluralism, and Globalization” in Ton 
Wilthagen, ed, Advancing Th eory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a Global Context 
(Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1998) 21 at 25.
72. Paul C Weiler, Governing the Workplace: Th e Future of Labor and Employment Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) at 118-24 [Weiler, Governing]; Panitch & 
Swartz, supra note 70; Dan Crow & Greg Albo, “Neo-Liberalism, NAFTA, and the State of 
the North American Labour Movements” (2005) 6 & 7 Just Lab 12.
73. See e.g. Richard A Posner, “Some Economics of Labor Law” (1984) 51:4 U Chicago L Rev 
988; Richard A Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1995) at 162-63; Richard A Epstein, “A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique 
of the New Deal Labor Legislation” (1983) 92:8 Yale LJ 1357; Milton Friedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) at 12-15; Weiler, Governing, ibid 
at 122-24.
74. Ibid.
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perspective from the 1980s is an important part of the story of the stagnation of 
labour law in both countries over the past quarter century. 
But it is only part of the story. Th e prescriptions of the neoclassical school 
have not been adopted, except at the margins. Work remains among the most 
regulated of relationships and collective bargaining remains embedded in 
labour statutes. Th e ascendancy of the neoclassical perspective manifests itself in 
more subtle ways, such as a reduced emphasis on enforcement of employment 
regulation, budget cuts to labour ministries, and an unwillingness to modernize 
existing legislation to make it more eff ective as the nature of work has evolved. A 
full frontal attack on government intervention in the employment relationship of 
the sort called for by neoclassicalists would have no political legs.
Th e dominant perspective on workplace law today is neither neoclassical 
nor pluralist. Industrial pluralism has given way to a perspective approximating 
what the industrial relations literature describes as the unitarist or managerialist 
perspective.75 Th e managerialist perspective is closely aligned with contemporary 
Human Resources Management (HRM). It describes collective bargaining 
in mostly negative terms, as rigid, confrontational, and costly for employers. 
Th ese attributes are said to be particularly harmful in the hyper-competitive 
era of economic globalization, when managerial fl exibility is crucial. In this 
climate, high levels of trust are required between employee and employer so that 
employers can tap into employee knowledge.76 Th e managerialist believes that 
employers can design human resource systems that foster trust by creating work 
environments in which employees are treated with decency, fairness, and respect, 
and that it is preferable to do this without collective bargaining. 
Th e defi ning feature of the managerialist position on labour and employment 
law is the belief that, ideally, neither is necessary. Employers have an economic 
interest in treating workers fairly, since engaged, satisfi ed workers are more 
productive workers who are also more likely to buy into the organization’s 
goals and to share useful information.77 Regulation can be useful insofar as it 
75. See e.g. John Godard, Industrial Relations, the Economy, and Society, 3d ed (Concord: Captus 
Press, 2005) at 12-15; John W Budd & Devasheesh Bhave, “Th e Employment Relationship” 
in Adrian Wilkinson et al, eds, Th e SAGE Handbook of Human Resource Management 
(London, UK: SAGE, 2010) 51.
76. Hugh Collins, “Is Th ere a Th ird Way in Labour Law?” in Anthony Giddens, ed, Th e Global 
Th ird Way Debate (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001) 300 at 306 [Collins, “Labour Law”].
77. Th is idea can be traced to the early work of Elton Mayo, in which he argued that industrial 
democracy movements in Britain and the United States would enthrone “‘collective 
mediocrity’ within the industry,” (at 56) while also arguing that business methods that 
“take no account of human nature and social motives” would lead to “strikes and sabotage” 
(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL70
encourages employers to adopt progressive HRM policies and supports their 
eff orts to do so. However, the fact that the state perceives a need for employment 
regulation and supportive collective bargaining legislation is perceived as a failure 
of management, as John W. Budd and Devasheesh Bhave describe:
Labor unions and government-mandated labor standards are viewed as unnecessary 
in the [managerialist] employment relationship. When employers successfully align 
their interests with their employees’ interests through eff ective human resource 
management practices, employees will be satisfi ed and will not support a labor union 
or need-mandated employment standards. Th e presence of a union or employment 
law is taken as a signal of failed human resource management practices. Unions are 
further seen as outside third parties that add confl ict to what should be a confl ict-
free employment relationship.78
Th e view that unionization is a response to poor management and weak HRM 
practices is widely held among contemporary North American managers. It is 
espoused regularly in management and HRM literature79 and captured in popular 
HRM slogans, such as “you get the union you deserve.”
Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers found that about one-third of American 
managers believed that a decision by workers under their supervision to unionize 
would refl ect poorly on their managerial skills and harm their careers.80 Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the HRM profession encourages managers to develop 
employment practices that will remove the incentive for employees to unionize. 
as an ordinary aspect of commerce (at 53). See Democracy and Freedom: An Essay in Social 
Logic (Melbourne: Macmillan & Co, 1919). His later work, including his studies in the 
famous Hawthorne experiments, set the foundation for the human relations and later 
human resource management schools. See Th e Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization 
(New York: Th e Macmillan Company, 1933); see also Paul Edwards, “Th e Employment 
Relationship and the Field of Industrial Relations” in Paul Edwards, ed, Industrial Relations: 
Th eory  and Practice, 2d ed (Malden: Blackwell, 2003) 1 at 10-11; Alan Fox, Industrial 
Sociology and Industrial Relations (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Offi  ce, 1966) at 5-6.
78. Supra note 75 at 64.
79. A common theme in human resources literature and scholarship is that employers can avoid 
unionization by removing employee demand for unionization through human resource 
policies. Th is strategy is often labeled “union substitution” or “union avoidance” in the 
Human Resources Management (HRM) and industrial relations literature. See Jon Peirce 
& Karen Joy Bentham, Canadian Industrial Relations, 3d ed (Toronto: Pearson Prentice 
Hall, 2007) at 41. For example, one leading Canadian human resources textbook advises 
that “[t]he best work environment, and the least receptive to unionization, is one that 
treats the individual with respect, dignity, and fairness, while encouraging participation in 
decision making.” See Monica Belcourt, George Bohlander & Scott Snell, Managing Human 
Resources, 6th ed (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2010) at 556.
80. See What Workers Want (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) at 116.
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For example, a leading professional HRM association in Canada holds regular 
seminars designed to teach managers what policies will achieve this result. A 
recent seminar fl yer included the following instructive:
If you are union-free, you should try to stay that way. Th is is not a matter of magic, 
legal trickery or blind luck. It takes consistent and eff ective management practiced day-
in and day-out, based on a long-term plan. Th e union only has to succeed once. To 
remain union-free, management has to succeed every single day, forever and always.81
HRM instructs managers to avoid unions by “off ering employees many services 
provided by union workplaces.”82 In other words, the unionized workplace is 
a source of information in the managerialist perspective about decent and fair 
employment practices. 
Th e perspective that workers join unions primarily as a response to perceived 
unfair treatment at the hands of their employer fi nds support in surveys of 
workers too. For example, the Freeman and Rogers survey measured the demand 
for unionization by non-union American workers, and found the following:
• 90% of employees want a union when relations between employees 
and employers are either Poor (50%) or Fair (40%), whereas only 
20% of employees want a union when employee-employer relations 
are excellent.
• 57% of employees want a union when they perceive management 
to be untrustworthy, whereas only 20% want a union when they 
have a lot of trust in management.
• 71% of employees want a union when management shows little 
concern for employees, whereas only 27% want a union when 
management shows a high level of concern for employees.
• 69% of employees want a union when their perceive management 
is unwilling to share power with employees, whereas only 18% 
want a union when they perceive management’s willingness to share 
power is excellent.83 
81. Human Resources Professionals Association, Protecting Your Organization from Unionization: 
How to keep your workplace union-free (10 November 2010), online: Canadian HR Reporter 
<http://www.hrreporter.com/DynamicData/AttachedImages/Webinar/html/Browser-
ProtectingYourOrgNov10-2010.html>. 
82. Anil Verma, “What Do Unions Do to the Workplace? Union Eff ects on Management and 
HRM Policies” (2005) 26:3 J Lab Research 415 at 443 (and studies cited therein).
83. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 80 at 110.
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Th ese results support the managerialist claim that progressive HRM strategies 
lessen the demand for union representation. Th ey also demonstrate that there 
is a high level of demand for unionization among employees of employers who 
do not adopt such policies and who treat their employees unfairly. In short, 
employees of “low road” employers have a high demand for unionization, as the 
managerialist perspective predicts.
Th e position that unions are principally a response to bad management has 
obvious political attractions. Th e neoclassical position that collective bargaining 
and employment regulation are always bad is too polarizing or extreme for many 
politicians and voters. Th e notion that unions serve a useful purpose by providing 
employees of bad, low road employers with  “voice” as an alternative to “exit”84 
allows such politicians and voters to straddle a middle political ground. Th ey are 
not against unions and collective bargaining per se, but nor do they believe the 
state should aggressively promote wide-scale unionization. Rather, they argue 
that the state’s role should be to encourage employers to treat their employees 
responsibly—to be high road employers—since this will improve productivity 
and employee (voter) contentment and contribute to the goal of a reasonable 
distribution of wealth while still giving workers access to collective bargaining 
when their employers mistreat them. Supporting unionization of low road 
employers demonstrates empathy with working people, while not privileging 
collective bargaining over the non-union, individual bargaining model.
Th is outlook leads managerialists to co-opt the language of employee 
choice and workplace democracy in order to emphasize their view that opting 
for unionization is an unusual decision. Th e managerialist assumes that most 
employers are “good” (that is, respectful, fair, and law-abiding) and that 
employees of a good employer will not unionize unless they are somehow 
misled or confused about the decision they are making. Th us, laws are needed 
to encourage and facilitate employer communications about unionization, and 
to ensure that employees have a right to a secret ballot vote on unionization 
and de-unionization (or decertifi cation). If these conditions are satisfi ed, and a 
majority of employees still select unionization, then the managerialist presumes 
that workers were treated so unfairly that they felt unionization was their best 
option short of quitting. In that case, the managerialist believes that the state is 
justifi ed in imposing collective bargaining and a duty to bargain on the employer. 
84. Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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Th is brief recounting of the managerialist perspective was intended to 
demonstrate a potential overlap with the pluralist perspective. Although there 
is profound disagreement about the overall utility of unions and collective 
bargaining, there is agreement that collective bargaining is a rational mechanism 
to deal with low road employers. Both perspectives agree that unionization may 
actually improve the situation at low road employers—certainly for employees, 
but perhaps also for the business. Industrial relations research demonstrates that 
unionization can shock employers into adopting more eff ective management 
techniques as well as introducing more employee training and better systems of 
communication with employees.85 
A basis for an uneasy political alliance between supporters of the managerialist 
and pluralist perspectives emerges, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Dominant 
perspectives on the appropriate role of unions and collective bargaining today 
range along a continuum. For our purposes, we can place the neoclassical 
perspective at one end and the pluralist at the other. Neoclassicalists reject any 
useful role for unions and collective bargaining and argue that the invisible hand of 
the market will deal with truly bad employers who mistreat employees. Pluralists, 
on the other hand, believe that unions and collective bargaining are necessary to 
counter the inherent imbalance of power in the employment relationship and to 
provide employees with a real voice in the workplace, and as such have intrinsic value. 
85. Anil Verma summarizes the extensive literature looking at the impact of unionizaiton. See 
Verma, supra note 82. 
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Th e managerialist perspective falls between these positions. It is sympathetic 
to the neoclassical position that collective bargaining is unnecessary and 
potentially disruptive to the economic goals of productivity, fl exibility, and 
profi tability. However, managerialists place their trust in enlightened employers, 
not in theoretical economic models to ensure workplaces that are productive and 
effi  cient, but also equitable to workers. Th us, as Figure 1 demonstrates, there is a 
potential zone of agreement between the managerialist and pluralist perspectives 
when it comes to dealing with recalcitrant, low road employers who treat their 
employees poorly. 
Th e political majority no longer accepts the pluralist claim that workers need 
collective bargaining. Neither does the majority accept the claims of neoclassicalists 
that the state should get out of the business of regulating employment contracts 
and abolish unions and collective bargaining. Instead, the prevailing view lies 
in the shared space that accepts a legitimate role for collective bargaining but 
a considerably more limited one than was the dominant view for most of the 
post-war period.86
Th e managerialist perspective that I have just described as politically dominant 
is nevertheless highly controversial. It is attacked from both the political left and 
right. If one believes that collective labour rights are fundamental human rights, 
for example, then the claim that employees do not need union representation so 
long as their employer maintains ‘progressive’ HRM policies is highly off ensive.87 
Critical scholars and pluralists fi nd preposterous the claim that a combination 
of markets and unilateral management practices can protect workers’ interests.88 
86. Th is dynamic is evident in political discourse surrounding recent labour law reform 
initiatives, such as the 12 August 1992 exchange between an Ontario Conservative Party 
opposition member (Elizabeth Witmer) and a Director of the United Steelworkers of 
America (Henry Hynd) during labour law reform consultations in the early 1990s. See 
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Resources Development, “Bill 40, 




entID=17907>. Both speakers—a conservative politician and a labour leader—agreed that 
employees would be unlikely to want a union if their employer treats them decently, and that 
employees would be more likely to opt for unionization if their employer treats them unfairly. 
87. See e.g. James A Gross, ed, Workers’ Rights as Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003); Roy J Adams, Labour Left Out: Canada’s Failure to Protect and Promote Collective 
Bargaining as a Human Right (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006).
88. See e.g. Eric Tucker, “Industry and Humanity Revisited: Everything Old is New Again,” 
Book Review of Governing the Workplace: Th e Future of Labor and Employment Law by Paul C 
Weiler (1991) 36:4 McGill LJ 1481; Weiler, Governing, supra note 72 at 218, 235-36.
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Pluralists and neoclassicalists alike reject the claim that the principal role for 
unions and collective bargaining should be to deal with ‘bad’ employers, but for 
very diff erent reasons. Pluralists perceive inherent value in collective bargaining 
for all employees (and employers as well),89 whereas the neoclassicalists argue that 
market forces alone will discipline ‘bad’ employers.90 
My point is not that the managerialist perspective is correct. Th e managerialist 
position that collective bargaining is unnecessary but nevertheless a rational 
response by employees to poor HR practices has become politically dominant 
only because it carves out enough common space from the various perspectives 
to erect an uneasy political middle ground. Centrists with a neoclassicalist bent 
can tolerate the limited role for unions in the managerialist perspective since 
it accepts that the non-union model is preferable. For centrists who lean more 
towards the pluralist approach, the managerialist perspective at least affi  rms a 
legitimate role for collective bargaining and unions.
Th e ascendancy of the managerialist perspective shapes the range of viable 
legislative reforms in workplace law, just as the Pluralist perspective guided the 
development of the Wagner Act model in the post-war era.91 Reforms most likely 
to gain traction are those that can be molded to fi t within the worldview of the 
managerialist perspective. Managerialists are ambivalent towards employment 
standards laws.92 A reasonable set of base norms set down in regulation can 
act as a signal to employers identifying the minimum expected level of decent 
employment practices within a jurisdiction. Managerialists will argue against 
standards perceived to be too high or too infl exible to be useful as a base 
default, but they also expect employers to comply with those standards that 
the government has fi xed. Obeying employment laws is part and parcel of the 
techniques a responsible employer deploys in order to attract the loyalty, trust, 
and commitment from employees that is necessary to exact maximum output.
As discussed above, while managerialists reject calls for aggressive state 
intervention to promote wide-scale collective bargaining, they are more 
sympathetic to the argument that the state should ensure that mistreated workers 
have access to collective bargaining. If they do not, and employment standards 
regulation continues to be poorly implemented, then these workers will either 
89. Weiler, ibid; Guy Davidov, “Th e (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law” (2007) 146:3-4 Int’l Lab 
Rev 311.
90. Armen A Alchian & William R Allen, University Economics, 3d ed (Belmont: Wadsworth, 
1972) at 407; Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980) at 218, 235-36.
91. Weiler, Governing, supra note 72 at 121.
92. Godard, supra note 75 at 15.
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quit or be left to toil under poor and abusive working conditions. Neither 
outcome is acceptable to the managerialist because both produce ineffi  cient 
workplaces staff ed by unmotivated and disloyal workers. Th is is the antithesis 
of what the managerialist perceives to be necessary for the modern high 
performance workplace. 
V. A DECENTRED PROPOSAL FOR WORKPLACE LAW 
REFORM 
It is possible to design a workplace law reform package that draws on the lessons 
of decentred regulation and that is consistent with the dominant managerialist 
perspective. Th e principal objectives would be twofold:
1. To encourage employers to adopt high road HRM practices 
(including, at least, compliance with the government’s minimum 
employment standards); and 
2. To ensure that non-union workers whose employers fail to adopt 
those high road HRM practices have access to collective bargaining 
to protect their interests.
Our existing laws are inadequate on both accounts. First, as noted previously, 
there are persistent high levels of non-compliance with even minimum 
employment standards regulation.93 Th is demonstrates that many employers are 
either ignorant of their statutory obligations or unmotivated to comply with 
them and that the existing legal model is failing to remedy this problem. 
Second, the existing union certifi cation model is heavily stacked against 
employees who desire collective bargaining, particularly when their employer is 
prepared to wage a heavy campaign against unionization. Even the worst low 
road employers, those that persistently violate employment laws for example, are 
still permitted to wage a pitched battle against their employees’ eff orts to secure 
collective bargaining. Th ey have at their disposal every legal right to resist such 
eff orts that is available to the best of the high road, law-abiding employers. From 
a decentred perspective, this represents a signifi cant wasted opportunity to steer 
employers towards greater attentiveness to employment standards. Employers 
who can ignore basic employment standards laws and still eff ectively impede 
their workers from unionizing also pose a problem for the managerialist. Workers 
of those low road employers have no viable voice mechanism94 to improve 
93. Supra note 2.
94. Supra note 84.
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their working conditions: Th ey will either quit, causing high turnover, or toil 
under poor conditions—neither of which will produce the effi  cient workplaces 
managerialists desire.
One decentred response to this problem becomes immediately evident: 
create two regulatory streams, one for law-abiding employers who obey the 
state’s employment standards (the low-risk stream), and another for employers 
who demonstrate a lack of capacity or willingness to comply with the state’s 
basic employment laws (the high-risk stream). Th is model would require a clear 
statement of what rules need to be complied with in order to qualify for the 
more favourable low-risk stream. Should breach of any work-related statute put 
an employer in the high-risk stream? Or, would the state wish to place special 
emphasis only on the breach of some special subset of rules? 
One option that would be consistent with the decentred approach would be 
to allow private actors themselves to develop a code that defi nes the bundle of rules 
that must be complied with in order to remain in the low-risk stream, perhaps 
working within parameters set down by the state. For example, a coalition of 
employers could engage in discussions with the major union organization (such 
as the provincial labour federation) and representatives of organizations that 
represent non-union workers. Th e code of conduct that emerges could then form 
the basis for the law’s distinctive treatment of high and low-risk employers.95 If 
the actors cannot agree on a model code, the state would implement its own, 
creating an incentive for employers to negotiate a voluntary agreement.
Th is is not as farfetched as it might at fi rst sound. Recent Australian 
legislation instructed key players in the textile and clothing industries, including 
producers, retailers, and the textile union, to negotiate a code of practice for 
the employment of home workers. Failing voluntary agreement, the legislation 
provided that the state would impose its own mandatory code that would govern 
employment practices in the industries.96 When the legislation was introduced, 
the government representative explained this aspect of the legislation as follows:
95. Th e New York City Greengrocer Code of Conduct operates in this way: In exchange for 
a conditional amnesty on some past employment standards violations, grocery employers 
were encouraged to bargain a code of conduct for employment practices with union and 
NGO representatives that would serve as the basis for ongoing government inspections. See 
Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 112.
96. See discussions in Michael Rawling, “A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain 
Outsourcing” in Christopher Arup et al, eds, Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation 
(Annandale: Federation Press, 2006) 520; Shelley Marshall, “Australian Textile Clothing and 
Footwear Supply Chain Regulation” in Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz, eds, Human Rights at 
Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 555. 
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Th e introduction of a mandatory code of practice for the clothing industry is 
provided for in the bill. However, it is not the Government’s preferred option. A 
mandatory code will only proceed if the self-regulatory mechanisms fail to deliver 
lawful entitlements to outworkers or the industry participants are not attempting in 
good faith to negotiate improvements or extensions to those mechanisms.97
A voluntary code was agreed upon, which the state then incorporated into 
law, making it mandatory. A benefi t of this approach is that it would include 
employer buy-in. Presumably, the standards that emerged would be ones that 
industry itself accepts as reasonable and attainable.
However, we can keep our model simple for the purpose of this general 
discussion. Even if the state were to contract out the development of a code of 
conduct, what emerged would certainly include a requirement to comply at least 
with some of the most obvious and important existing employment-related rules. 
It could include more than this, but it would surely include at least this much. 
So we can begin with that. Th e state could select a bundle of core laws that it 
wishes to emphasize and identify those laws as the “Base Code of Responsible 
Employment Practices” (“Code”), similar to the American government’s “eff ective 
compliance program” used to defi ne which companies are granted preferential 
sentencing, mentioned earlier in Part II.98 Th is Code might include, for example, 
the following important rules governing employment practices: 
• Minimum wage
• Overtime pay rules
• Hours of work restrictions
• Termination and severance pay requirements
• Unfair labour practices governing union organizing campaigns
Th e latter refers to legislative restrictions found in labour relations statutes that 
prohibit employers from interfering with employees’ decisions about whether 
to unionize through threats, intimidation, promises, or coercion (including 
dismissals or punishment of union supporters).99 
While violating laws not included in the Code will still attract the usual array 
of sanctions (fi nes, back pay orders, et cetera), an employer that violates one of 
the laws included in the Code would, in addition to the normal remedies, forfeit 
97. See New South Wales, Legislative Council, Hansard (11 December 2001) at 1959 (Hon John 
Della Bosca), online: <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/PARLMENT/hansArt.nsf/
V3Key/LC20011211037>. 
98. See discussion in Parker, supra note 41.
99. See, for example, the Labour Relations Act, SO 1995, c 1, ss 70, 72, 76 [OLRA] (which sets 
out the relevant restrictions in Ontario).
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a bundle of additional legal rights and benefi ts available only to employers who 
have earned their place in the low-risk stream by demonstrating responsible, law-
abiding behaviour. Th is alone is a very diff erent way of thinking about workplace 
law than what we are used to in Canada. It blurs the distinction between the 
employment standards and labour relations regimes in a way we are not used 
to. But it is consistent with the decentred approach to regulation: It uses sticks 
and carrots to steer behaviour, and it deploys the risk of forfeiting valued rights 
to resist collective bargaining with the expectation that employers averse to 
collective bargaining will fi nd greater value in learning and complying with the 
Code and will accordingly adjust their internal management systems to promote 
legal compliance. It also harnesses the knowledge and power of private actors, 
including unions and other actors interested in protecting workers’ interests in 
ways I will explain below.
Having explored how the law might diff erentiate between high- and low-risk 
employers, we can now fl esh out how the two regulatory streams might vary. 
What would law-abiding, low-risk employers receive to encourage continued legal 
compliance? What rights would law-breaking, high-risk employers forfeit under 
this model? Th e distinction needs to be suffi  ciently stark to create an incentive 
to comply with the Code, while also facilitating access to collective bargaining 
for employees of high-risk employers. Some familiar possibilities come to mind. 
For example, high-risk employers could be disqualifi ed from receiving various 
government benefi ts, such as procurement possibilities in government tenders, 
government business licenses needed to conduct various types of activities, and tax 
incentives.100 Government inspections of employment law compliance could be 
more frequent for high-risk employers on the theory that they pose a greater risk 
of non-compliance.101 This would assist governments in targeting scarce resources 
at high-risk areas. Transparency could be useful here too; the state could publish a 
“sunshine list” of employers who violate the Code as a form of public shaming, which 
could motivate some employers who are sensitive to negative publicity.102 
100. Interestingly, the Ontario Minister of Labour recently contacted the Mayor of 
Nashville to request that an employer that had violated Ontario’s Employment 
Standards Act not be awarded a lucrative telecommunications contract from the 
Nashville government. See “Oshawa Closure: A matter of worker rights”, Th e 
Toronto Star (20 July 2011), online: <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/
article/1028006--oshawa-closure-a-matter-of-worker-rights>.
101. See Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 219-21.
102. Th e Ontario government is already moving in this direction. See Employment Standards Act, 
SO 2000, c 41, s 138.1. Th is recently enacted provision empowers the Ministry of Labour 
to publish the names and off ences of persons and companies that have committed off ences 
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However, an even more novel and powerful set of incentives can be built into 
our dual regulatory track model that would help achieve both key objectives cited 
above: encouraging compliance with the Code, and ensuring that employees of 
high-risk employers are able to secure access to collective bargaining despite 
predictably hostile resistance from their law-breaking employers. Th e law could 
create a distinction in the bundle of rights available to employers to participate 
in the union organizing process. As noted earlier, employers are presently granted 
a considerable arsenal of legal rights to resist their employees’ attempts to gain 
access to collective bargaining. Th ese rights could be treated as earned rights 
available only to responsible, law-abiding employers, rather than unconditional 
entitlements as the law currently treats them. 
 Th e rights I am referring to include: speech rights to campaign against 
unionization; property rights to exclude union organizers from non-working 
areas of employer property; and the right to insist on a certifi cation ballot in 
the face of documentary union membership evidence representing a majority 
of bargaining unit employees. All of these rights to resist unionization have 
been restricted in Canada (and abroad) at one time or another, so nothing in 
this proposal is revolutionary. However, making these rights contingent upon a 
demonstration of responsible employment practices does require a new way of 
thinking. Th ere is much to commend the idea. 
Consider more closely the rights our existing laws confer on employers 
to resist their employees’ eff orts to secure access to collective bargaining. First, 
common law and trespass to property legislation grant employers the right to 
exclude union organizers from any place on employer property.103 Second, in 
most Canadian jurisdictions employers have broad rights to proselytize against 
collective bargaining through “captive audience meetings” in which employees are 
ordered to stop work and listen to the employer’s message through one-on-one 
discussions, by email, in literature, on bulletin boards, and even at an employee’s 
home.104 Laws impose restrictions on the content of the speech—there cannot be 
threats, intimidation, or promises of rewards for rejecting unionization. However, 
under the Act. Each month the government publishes a list of off enders, including their 
off ence and fi ne.
103. See Patrick Macklem, “Property, Status, and Workplace Organizing” (1990) 40 UTLJ 74; 
Dianne Avery, “Federal Labor Rights and Access to Private Property: Th e NLRB and the 
Right to Exclude” (1989) 11:2 Indus Rel LJ 145.
104. Th e federal Labour Board restricts employer speech to a much greater extent than its 
provincial counterparts, generally denying a right of employer anti-union speech. See Union 
Bank of Employees (Ontario), Local 2104 v Bank of Montreal (1985), 10 CLRBR (NS) 129 
(WL) [Bank of Montreal]. 
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the law’s preference for employer communicative access to workers during the 
union organizing campaign has long been noted as a peculiarity of the Wagner 
Act model.105
Contrast this model with the British approach to governing certifi cation 
elections. Th e British statutory certifi cation system assumes that a purpose of 
a legal model governing a unionization election should be to promote parity of 
access to employees to produce a relatively balanced presentation of the issues.106 
Th e law requires that unions be given access to the workplace during working 
hours to address the workers to an amount roughly equal to the time spent by the 
employer communicating with workers. It also facilitates union communication with 
employees outside of work. Th e employer must provide the government with the 
employees’ home addresses so that the state can mail union literature to the employees. 
Canadian laws confer no such rights on unions during organizing campaigns.
Th ird, employers in most (though not all) Canadian jurisdictions may now 
insist upon a certifi cation ballot (mandatory ballot) conducted by the state, even 
when a clear majority of workers have already signed union membership cards 
indicating their support for collective bargaining.107 Until the 1990s, the more 
common model in Canada required only that unions demonstrate majority 
support in the form of documentary evidence (card-check model). Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that workers have a much more diffi  cult time getting 
access to collective bargaining when the process requires unions to collect 
union membership cards and then also win a subsequent ballot.108 Scholars 
attribute this result in large measure to the anti-union campaigns (both lawful 
105. Macklem, supra note 103; Julius G Getman, Stephen B Goldberg & Jeanne B Herman, 
Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976) 
at 97, 157; Karl E Klare, “Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for 
Legal Reform” (1988) 38:1 Cath U L Rev 1; and David J Doorey, “Union Access to Workers 
during Organizing Campaigns: A New Look Th rough the Lens of BC Health Services” (2009-
2010) 15:1 CLELJ 1 [Doorey, “Union Access”].
106. Alan L Bogg, “Th e Political Th eory of Trade Union Recognition Campaigns: Legislating 
For Democratic Competitiveness” (2001) 64 Mod L Rev 875 at 886; Ruth Dukes, “Th e 
Statutory Recognition Procedure 1999: No Bias in Favour of Recognition?” (2008) 37 Ind 
LJ 236 at 248.
107. Th e Federal jurisdiction, along with Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and 
Quebec still permit unions to be certifi ed without a ballot upon demonstrating majority 
support in the form of documentary evidence.
108. See Chris Riddell, “Union Certifi cation Success under Voting Versus Card-Check 
Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1998” (2004) 57 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 
493; Susan Johnson, “Card Check or Mandatory Representation Vote? How the Type of 
Union Recognition Procedure Aff ects Union Certifi cation Success” (2002) 112:479 Econ J 344.
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and unlawful) waged by employers in the days preceding the ballot.109 In a 
card-check system, the opportunity for employers to campaign against collective 
bargaining is more limited.
When North American unions and employers bargain private contracts 
governing union campaigns, often referred to as “neutrality agreements,” they 
focus on these legal rights the North American model confers on employers to 
resist their employees’ eff orts to unionize. Neutrality agreements emerged in the 
United States in the 1980s and subsequently crossed the border into Canada.110 
Th ey are designed to facilitate a less combative process than that envisioned by 
the public legal model. Th e most common terms in these agreements include a 
requirement for the employer to remain ‘neutral’ and to refrain from arguing 
against unionization, union access to the workplace and to information enabling 
it to contact workers outside of the workplace, and a card-check certifi cation 
process that permits a union to prove majority support by submitting union 
membership cards alone, rather than also winning a vote.111 All of these were 
components of the recently negotiated Framework of Fairness neutrality 
agreement between Magna International, Inc. and the Canadian Auto Workers, 
for example.112
Recall that one of the lessons of the decentred approach is that governments 
should observe and learn from private norm-making processes. If we want to 
know how the law could better facilitate unionization of law-breaking, high-risk 
employers, we need look no further than what unions have bargained themselves 
in neutrality agreements. 
To summarize, therefore, the rights that responsible, law-abiding 
employers should earn in the low-risk stream, and conversely, the legal rights 
law-breaking, irresponsible employers should forfeit in the high-risk stream 
would include the following: 
109. Ibid; See also Weiler, Governing, supra note 72 at 13-15; Karen J Bentham, “Employer 
Resistance to Union Certifi cation: A Study of Eight Canadian Jurisdictions” (2002) 57:1 RI 
159.
110. See discussion in David J Doorey, “Neutrality Agreements: Bargaining for Representation 
Rights in the Shadow of the State” (2006-2007) 13 CLELJ 41; James J Brudney, “Neutrality 
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms” (2005) 
90:3 Iowa L Rev 819. Th e best known Canadian neutrality agreement involved the 2007 
Canadian Auto Workers-Magna International Framework of Fairness. See analysis in Martin 
H Malin, “Th e Canadian Auto Workers-Magna International, Inc Framework of Fairness 
Agreement: A US Perspective” (2010) 54:2 Saint Louis ULJ 525.
111. Adrienne E Eaton & Jill Kriesky, “Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check 
Agreements” (2001) 55:1 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 42.
112. See Malin, supra note 110.
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• Th e right of employer speech intended to dissuade workers from supporting 
collective bargaining and unions. High-risk employers would be 
prohibited from proselytizing against unionization.
• Th e right to exclude union organizers from non-working areas of the 
workplace. High-risk employers would be required to grant some 
level of access to union organizers to address workers in non-working 
areas, and/or a means of communicating with the workers outside of the 
workplace (as already occurs in both the United States and Britain113).
• Th e right to insist on a secret ballot, even when the union has submitted 
documentary evidence of majority support. In other words, a card-
check system of certifi cation would replace a mandatory ballot 
model for high-risk employers.
In practice, since these rights already exist as embedded entitlements in many 
Canadian jurisdictions, the new model would presumably operate as a forfeiture 
system: Once an employer was found in violation of the Code by an appropriate 
adjudicating body, it would forfeit the special rights that low-risk employers have 
earned. For an even stronger model, the state could go further and make access to 
fi rst contract arbitration easier in the case of employees governed by the high-risk 
stream on the theory that an employer that violates employment laws is also at 
high-risk of trying to avoid a fi rst collective agreement.114
Th e proposal to remove rights to resist unionization and to enable unions 
to be certifi ed by means of membership evidence would no doubt be met with 
strong opposition by many employers and opponents of collective bargaining. We 
are already familiar with the arguments against restricting employer participation 
in organizing campaigns. Paul C. Weiler described them succinctly more than 
twenty years ago:
[Th e] argument for designing a representation procedure that invites extensive 
employer participation rests not on a principle of fairness to employers as such, but 
113. In the United States, unions are entitled to receive the home addresses and email addresses 
of bargaining unit employees prior to a state-conducted ballot. See supra note 104 for 
discussions of the British model. 
114. See OLRA, supra note 99, s 43(2). Existing Canadian labour legislation already conditions 
access to fi rst contract arbitration on the employer’s behaviour. For example, in determining 
whether to order fi rst contract arbitration in Ontario, the Labour Board can consider the 
employer’s refusal to recognize the authority of the union, the employer’s uncompromising 
bargaining position, or “any other reason the Board considers relevant.” A simple amendment 
could make explicit that a previous violation of employment-related legislation would be a 
factor the Board should consider in deciding whether to order arbitration.
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rather on the practical judgment that only the employer and its management can 
defend the statutory rights of the antiunion employees.115
Th e argument is that there is a need for employers to make the case to employees 
for why they are better off  dealing directly with their employer, without 
professional union representation and collective bargaining, since unions 
certainly will not make that case. Employers are cast in the role of protector 
of workers, who otherwise are prone to being misled by union organizers. Th e 
same basic premise underlies the argument for mandatory ballots; without a vote, 
employees may be duped or pressured into signing a union membership card 
without full knowledge of the implications. A vote ensures that the employer 
will have a chance to present the argument against collective bargaining and 
guarantees that the employees are completely free of any undue infl uence when 
they cast their ballots. 
However, as Weiler and many others since have noted, if employers never 
engaged in threats or intimidation designed to infl uence votes, those arguments 
might be persuasive. But in the real world, too many employers cannot resist the 
temptation to suggest to their employees that bad things might happen if they 
vote in favour of collective bargaining. Weiler explained:
[A]ll other things being equal, a more informed employee choice would be a freer 
one, [but] the problem is that when we extend an opportunity to the law-abiding 
employer to illuminate the issues for its employees, we inevitably create both the 
opportunity and the incentive for the law-violating employer to intimidate its 
workers in their decision…116
The decentred model discussed in this section strikes at this fundamental 
dilemma inherent in the majoritarian system established by the Wagner Act 
model. It distinguishes law-abiding from law-violating employers by placing the 
latter under stricter state control in order to protect the right of workers to freely 
access collective bargaining. 
Th ere is also a moral justifi cation for the dual regulatory model. An employer 
that lacks the decency to comply with the state’s base Code of decent employment 
practices demonstrates a high level of disrespect for its employees’ interests and 
a lack of respect for legal authority. Th e argument that the employer’s voice is 
needed during an organizing campaign in order to inform employees of the 
supposed benefi ts of dealing with the employer directly, rather than as a collective, 
rings particularly hollow when applied to a law-breaking employer. Employers 
115. Governing, supra note 72 at 260-61.
116. Ibid at 261 [emphasis added].
DOOREY, RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE LAW 85
who violate the Code have demonstrated their unfi tness to play the role of 
employee protectorate, and they should get out of the way so that employees 
can decide for themselves if the non-union model is serving them adequately. 
Th e concern about unions stating mistruths to employees in order to trick or 
pressure them into signing union cards could be dealt with by the creation of 
a dedicated neutral government labour relations offi  cer with responsibility to 
answer employee queries directly. 
VI. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
I have been discussing an application of decentred regulation at a rather general 
level. Naturally, there are details that would need to be worked out to fi ll in 
the model that are beyond the space limitations of this paper. For example, 
lawmakers would need to determine the rules governing union access and the 
card-check model for the employers who have violated Code rules. Th is should 
not be diffi  cult, given that there are existing precedents for both. Th ey would 
need to determine the penalty for employers who exercise rights that they have 
not earned. For example, what if an employer who by breaching the Code has 
forfeited the right to argue against collective bargaining nevertheless does so in 
a captive audience meeting? Perhaps remedial certifi cation would be appropriate 
in these cases to send a strong message to employers and serve as a deterrent.117 
Th e state would also need to decide whether the forfeiture of the legal 
rights is permanent or temporary. It would probably make sense to allow an 
employer in the high-risk stream to re-qualify for the low-risk stream after a 
specifi ed violation-free period and following an inspection by the state. Would a 
single violation of the state’s Base Code of Responsible Employment Practices lead to 
forfeiture of legal rights, or should the two-track model be progressive? Perhaps a 
single violation could cause the employer to lose some legal rights (like employer 
speech rights) as a sort of shot across the bow and signal to the employer to get help 
learning how to comply, but a second violation could lead to a total forfeiture. 
Th ese are details that could be worked out without too much diffi  culty. At 
a more general level, the model discussed in Part V has several benefi ts. First, it 
has the potential to attract broader support than proposals that more aggressively 
promote collective bargaining, such as the proposal for across the board card-
check certifi cation and fi rst contract arbitration found in the failed American 
117. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 99, s 11. Th e certifi cation remedy is usually applied only when, 
due to unlawful employer conduct, it is no longer possible to test the employees’ wishes 
through other means such as card-check or ballot.
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Employee Free Choice Act.118 Th e fact that the dual regulatory stream model 
draws its inspiration and learns from privately negotiated agreements between 
unions and employers may allow it to attract support from the labour movement, 
particularly union organizing departments, and therefore from politicians aligned 
with the labour movement. 
However, unlike many other reform proposals that envision a positive 
role for unions and collective bargaining, this one has the potential to attract 
support beyond the labour movement and industrial pluralists. Neoclassicalists 
who perceive no value in employment standards laws or collective bargaining 
will never be persuaded. But the model discussed above could fi nd support 
among managerialists, or at least attract a less hostile response than most other 
reforms advanced by industrial pluralists. Th e model incorporates into law the 
managerialist prediction that employers who treat their employees with respect 
and decency will face little demand for unionization, but that employers who fail 
to do so should anticipate an organizing campaign. Th e model targets only those 
employers who reject the HRM philosophy that legal compliance and high levels 
of respect towards employees are necessary to produce effi  cient workplaces. As a 
result, politicians and others who argue against the dual regulatory stream would 
be cast in the role of defending the rights of employers who lack the capacity or 
decency to comply with even the most basic of minimum employment standards 
laws. Th ey may not cherish that position. In addition, although unions rank 
low in recent public opinion polls, the public may be more sympathetic to the 
argument that unions are helpful in protecting workers from ‘bad’ employers. 
Second, the model, although novel in its orientation, is actually quite modest. 
As noted, the legal rights that law-breaking employers would forfeit are common 
in private neutrality agreements already being bargained by employers and unions, 
and none of the restrictions are legislatively novel. Canadian governments have 
at various times required employers to remain neutral during union organizing 
campaigns.119 Th ere are plenty of precedents in Canadian, British, and American 
118. William B Gould, IV, “Th e Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and 
What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the 
United States” (2008) 43:2 USF L Rev 291.
119. For example, in the federal sector, an employer that attempts to persuade employees to reject 
collective bargaining is unlawfully “interfering in the formation of a union.” See e.g. American 
Airlines Inc (Toronto) v BRAC, [1981] 3 CLRBR 90, 90 CLS 6-3095; Bank of Montreal, supra 
note 102. Complete neutrality has also been the rule in Saskatchewan (see e.g. SuperValu v Alberta 
Food & Comercial Workers, Local 401, [1981] 3 CLRBR 412 (WL); Saskatchewan Joint Board 
(RWDSU) v Brown Industries (1976) Ltd [1995], SLRBD No 19) and British Columbia (see e.g. 
IWA Local 1-357 v Consumer Pallet Ltd, [1974] BCLRBD No 37 (QL)). 
DOOREY, RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE LAW 87
labour law for rules requiring that unions be granted access to workers both at 
the workplace and at their homes.120 Th e Ontario Labour Relations Act already 
employs mandatory ballots for some workplaces and card-check for others, 
and the two models coexist throughout Canada.121 Th e novelty in the approach 
discussed here lies only in bundling these restrictions on employer discretion and 
then linking them with illegal employer behaviour. 
Th ird, the dual regulatory model has the potential to harness the energy and 
expertise of private actors in improving workplace practices. Since the result of 
proving a breach of the Code would include a more preferential union-organizing 
climate, the model includes a built-in incentive for unions and other worker advocates 
to help the state uncover and enforce employment law violations. Consistent with a 
core objective of the decentred approach, the model aims to harness private actors in 
the inspection and enforcement process of public obligations.
Unions might create hotlines for non-union employees to report employment 
standards violations if they believed helping those employees prove the violations 
will lead them to new members and new bargaining units. Unions might also 
represent non-union workers in bringing complaints forward, which would 
benefi t those workers and improve the quality of representation before the 
employment tribunals. If the “sunshine list” of Code violators is posted, unions 
could use it to target their organizing resources. Poverty law clinics and worker 
activists are already involved in searching out abusive employers and advocating 
on employees’ behalf.122 Th e proposed model creates an incentive for these private 
actors to form a private inspectorate and to build bridges to non-union workers 
120. For example, there are Canadian laws that require: employers operating in some remote 
areas to permit union organizers onto company property for the purposes of conversing with 
employees; mall owners to waive property rights to enable unions to contact employees of 
mall tenants; and employers or distance workers to provide contact information to enable 
union organizing. See discussion in Doorey, “Union Access,” supra note 105. In addition, 
labour boards in Canada have ordered employers to grant unions access to the workplace as 
a part of a remedial order for violations of labour relations legislation. See e.g. USWA v Baron 
Metal Industries Inc, [2001] OLRB Rep 931, 73 CLRBR (2d) 301. 
121. Construction employers are governed by a card-check system, whereas other employers are 
subject to a mandatory model. See OLRA, supra note 99, ss 128.1 (providing for card-check 
certifi cation in the construction sector), 7-10 (providing for governing of all other workplaces 
by mandatory ballots). 
122. See e.g. Cranford et al, supra note 64; Janice Fine, “Community Unions and the Revival 
of the American Labor Movement” (2005) 33:1 Pol & Soc’y 153; Amanda Tattersall, “A 
Little Help from Our Friends: Exploring and Understanding when Labor-Community 
Coalitions are Likely to Form” (2009) 34:4 Lab Stud J 485; and Janice Fine & Jennifer 
Gordon, “Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through partnerships with Workers’ 
Organizations” (2010) 38:4 Politics & Soc’y 552. 
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who are in need of skilled advocacy.123 Canadian unions have already recognized 
the need to be more active in defending the interests of non-union workers.124 
Th e proposed model would assist in that regard.
Fourth, there is a good basis to believe that the proposed model could 
improve overall compliance with employment standards legislation. Consider an 
employer like Wal-Mart. In the United States, Wal-Mart has been found to be 
in violation of employment standards laws on multiple occasions amounting to 
illegal nonpayment of wages totaling millions of dollars.125 Th e remedies assessed 
consist mostly of monies that should have been paid the employees in the fi rst 
place. Although large on their face, these amounts are relatively insignifi cant to 
the most profi table retailer in the world. Despite its violations of employment 
laws, Wal-Mart retained all of the rights available to American employers to 
campaign against their employees’ unionization eff orts, and it exercises these 
rights vigorously. 
Given Wal-Mart’s well-known aversion to collective bargaining, there is good 
reason to believe that the potential of losing the right to campaign against unionization 
and to insist on a ballot would have a greater deterrent impact than the existing 
threat of back-wage orders and fi nes.126 Th e possibility of forfeiting the rights to 
campaign against unionization would be expected to infl uence how a company like 
Wal-Mart sets its internal management policies. For example, in a recent decision, 
a Wal-Mart manager was dismissed for altering payroll records to avoid recording 
overtime pay earned by employees. A Canadian appellate court confi rmed a jury 
fi nding that the employee was dismissed without cause because he believed he was 
properly implementing a “zero overtime” directive set by Wal-Mart’s head offi  ce.127 
123. To make these organizations more eff ective in this role, the state could set aside additional 
funding, something Professor Arthurs recommended in Fairness at Work, supra note 2 at 199.
124. For example, in a draft discussion paper issued by the Canadian Auto Workers and the 
Communications, Energy, and Paperworkers Union in 2012, included as a key objective for 
the labour movement in the future must be fi nding ways to better advocate on behalf of “all 
workers” and not just union members. See “CAW–CEP Discussion Paper” (11 November 
2011), online: Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada <http://www.
cep.ca/sites/cep.ca/fi les/docs/en/120126_CAW-CEP_Discussion_Paper.pdf>.
125. See Joe Schneider & Margaret Cronin Fisk, “Wal-Mart to Pay $54 Million to Settle 
Minnesota Suit” Bloomberg News (9 December 2008), online: <http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTBVXl48DYGQ>. Th is article reviews several American 
decisions in which Wal-Mart was found to have violated employment standards laws, 
including a Minnesota judgment fi nding “over 2 million violations” of wage laws. 
126. For a discussion of Wal-Mart’s eff orts to resist unionization in Canada and the Unitd States, 
see Roy J Adams, “Organizing Wal-Mart: Th e Canadian Campaign” (2005) 6&7 Just Lab 1.
127. Day v Wal-Mart Canada Inc, 2000 NSCA 127, 188 NSR (2d) 69.
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If the remedy for non-payment of statutory overtime included forfeiting all 
rights to campaign against unionization at the store, and perhaps a switch to a 
card-check model, we can reasonably anticipate that a union-averse employer 
(like Wal-Mart) would adjust its policies to emphasize to managers the need 
to comply with overtime laws at all costs. For example, a zero overtime policy 
might be revised to instruct managers to pay overtime if there is any doubt about 
whether an employee is entitled to it. Th at is a subtle shift in internal policy, 
but it can have the eff ect of shifting the default rule from “do not pay unless 
ordered to by an adjudicator” to “err on the side of payment, unless it is clear that 
overtime is not payable.” Th is would be an extremely useful shift in emphasis if 
the goal is to improve compliance with overtime laws.
Finally, since the outcome of a fi nding of non-compliance with employment 
laws would be an organizing climate more favourable to union organizing, the 
model may facilitate access to collective bargaining. Th is could energize union 
organizers and assist in the slow process of rebuilding the institution of collective 
bargaining. Moreover, since only law-breaking employers will experience the 
new restrictions on their legal rights to resist unionization, the model specifi cally 
targets the worst workplaces, where workers can most benefi t from the protections 
off ered by unionization and collective bargaining.
For all of these reasons, the model discussed in Part V could improve 
compliance with employment laws while facilitating collective bargaining. 
Now the bad news: A threat of being unionized will be a hollow one for many 
employers who violate employment standards, so the risk of losing legal rights 
to resist unionization may have little eff ect on them. Employers with less than 
twenty employees may have little to fear given the persistently low rates of union 
density in small workplaces, though perhaps the model could help address this 
issue.128 Similarly, the thousands of employees who are excluded from collective 
bargaining statutes altogether would not be expected to receive much benefi t 
from a model that draws power from the risk of unionization, although the 
information disclosure requirements could still be useful. 
In addition, even if the dual regulatory model did facilitate union 
organizing, there is no guarantee that this would translate into long-term 
128. For example, the 2009 union density rate in Canada for workplaces with fewer than 20 
employees was only 13.3%, compared to 29.7% for workplaces with between 20-99 
employees, 40.9% for workplaces with 100-500 employees, and 52.2% for workplaces with 
over 500 employees. See Sharanjit Uppal, “Table 2 Union Membership, 2009” Unionization 
2010 (29 October 2010), online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-
001-x/2010110/tables-tableaux/11358/tbl002-eng.htm>.
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sustainable collective bargaining relationships. We need only look to the history 
of successful certifi cations at companies like Wal-Mart or Canada’s chartered 
banks, and the subsequent decertifi cations and closures, to recognize that there 
is no necessary correlation between obtaining bargaining rights and achieving 
a durable collective bargaining relationship.129 Furthermore, some particularly 
union-averse employers might simply shut down if they lost the legal right to 
resist unionization or if their employees unionize. Some businesses might be 
so concerned about losing their right to resist unionization, and have so little 
confi dence in their capacity to comply with the Code, that they would just avoid 
a jurisdiction that passed laws like these altogether.
Th ese issues refl ect systemic limitations of the labour relations model itself, 
which are not overcome by the proposal discussed here. More fundamentally, since 
that proposal does not alter the power relations in capitalist societies that permit, 
if not encourage, a subordinated worker class, it may be that little of substance 
will change in terms of employment outcomes. Th is is a criticism directed from 
the left at most modest proposals for workplace law reform. Any legal proposal 
pragmatic enough to attract broad political support will be so watered down that 
its usefulness is at best limited. Th erefore, such proposals simply divert attention 
away from more fundamental campaigns to overhaul power relations throughout 
society.
Indeed, the left’s objection to the specifi c decentred approach described in 
this paper may run deeper than just the usual criticism against modest reforms 
to employment-related statutes. Th e dual regulatory stream approach does 
not challenge the existing premise inherent in the Wagner Act model that it is 
acceptable for employers to resist unionization. It simply creates an exception 
to that presumption for high-risk employers. Th is could be seen as legitimizing 
employer resistance to collective bargaining precisely at a time when unions and 
human rights advocates are deeply engaged in a campaign to push labour rights 
as human rights. Many employers and those on the political right would also be 
expected to resist the model discussed here. Th ey would reject the premise that 
collective bargaining is a valuable and important means for assisting vulnerable 
workers. In some corners, the right to resist unionization is considered so 
129. In the United States, only 56% of newly certifi ed bargaining units are successful at 
bargaining fi rst collective agreements. See John-Paul Ferguson, “Th e Eyes of the Needles: 
A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004” (2008) 62:1 Indus & 
Lab Rel Rev 3 at 5; See also  Anne Forrest, “Securing the Male Breadwinner: A Feminist 
Interpretation of PC 1003” (1997) 52:1 RI 91; and Rosemary Warskett, “Bank Worker 
Unionization and the Law” (1988) 25 Stud in Pol Econ’y 41. 
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sacrosanct that there can be no justifi cation for its restriction, even in the case of 
the worst law-breaking employers. 
However, on the one hand, reforms to workplace law are always controversial, 
so the presence of strong resistance from some stakeholders should never itself 
be a reason to dismiss a reform proposal. On the other hand, there may be good 
reasons not to adopt any particular legal reform, whether they take the form 
of a decentred regulatory approach or not. Th e potential contribution of the 
decentred approach to regulation is not that it will end heated debates about the 
effi  cacy of workplace laws. 
Th e objective of this article is not to persuade readers that the particular 
model discussed in Part V is the only, or even the best, possibility for workplace 
law reform. Th e objective is far more modest. It is to investigate whether there are 
any useful insights that can be drawn from the decentred regulation literature for 
the future of workplace law. My own conclusion is that the literature does open 
up some new ways of thinking about old problems. For that reason alone, there 
is value in exploring further how decentred regulation might contribute to the 
challenge of identifying ways to move forward with workplace law reform at a 
time when there is so little consensus on which path to take. 
